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Whom to target – an obvious choice? 
Esther Schüring, Research Fellow, MGSoG 
Franziska Gassmann, Senior Researcher, MGSoG 
 
Abstract 
There has been an ongoing debate among researchers, policy-makers and development partners in 
low-income countries on whether and to what de gree non-contributory social transfers should be 
targeted to the poor or paid out universally to every citizen or to all citizens in a particular 
category. This paper critically discusses the assumptions behind the political economy arguments 
of targeting and tests whether a universal m echanism is bound to politic ally excel in a low-
income country context. A num ber of authors have argued that going universal is a win-win 
situation, both for the poor, th e middle class as well as thos e who are in power. W e would 
therefore expect broad-based support behind a universal scheme, in particular in countries where 
poverty is widespread and target ing also proves adm inistratively challenging. On the basis of 
attitudinal surveys with the urban, rural and st udent population in Zambia , we actually detect 
more support for targeting the poor than the po litical economy models would predict. These 
findings are corroborated by experim ental evidence from rural Zambia. W e discuss the 
assumptions of the political economy m odels in the light of  these findings and contem plate on 
potentially decisive parameters that the models currently do not incorporate. 
 
Key words: political economy, targeting, universalism 
JEL codes: H53, I38, O15 
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1 Introduction 
There has been an ongoing debate among researchers, policy-makers and development partners in 
developing countries on whether and to what degr ee non-contributory social transfers should be 
targeted. Targeting con cerns the allocation an d distribution of resources  and services to one 
particular (sub-) group. In the context of SCT, we  refer to the process of  granting transfers to 
recipients who are poor, particularly vulnerabl e or deprived, identified through means-testing, 
multiple-indicator-targeting or equ ivalent. The alternative to ta rgeting would be to allocate  
transfers to everybody (universal ap proach), albeit this is usually restricted to certain categories 
such as the elderly or children. In a strict sense, universal transfers would refer to a basic income, 
which every citizen in society receives.  
   
Standard economic theory predicts that given a fixed budget for redistribution, targeting is the 
optimal solution as it re nders the most effective and efficient outcome with the hig hest level of 
utility for the poor (see e.g. Coady et al., 2004, Besely, 1990, Bes ely and Kanbur, 1990, 
Atkinson, 1995, Atkinson, 1998). Following this logic,  the less resources le ak to the non-poor 
and the higher the share received  by the poor, the better the cost-e ffectiveness of an anti-poverty 
programme. These models are criticized for ign oring the costs associated with targeting such as 
disincentive effects, informational constraints like the difficulty of correctly identifying the poor, 
social costs of asymmetric power and efficiency losses due to leakage and higher adm inistrative 
costs (Sen, 1995, Atkinson, 1995, Atkinson, 1998). Fu rthermore, they neglect any political 
economy considerations (Gelbach  and Pritchett, 2002, Pritchett,  2005, Moene and Wallerstein, 
2001, De Donder and Hindriks, 1998).  
 
3 
 
The political econom y of targeting takes the problems of targeting beyond m erely economic 
issues of selection, inform ation and incentives. It is concerned w ith the political feasibility of 
targeting policies (Sen, 1995) and highlights that only a naive policy maker would assume a fixed 
budget for redistribution (Gelbach  and Pritchett, 2002). The political economy models of 
targeting postulate that the level of targeting and the corresponding budget for social spending are 
interlinked. By taking into ac count that the budget is determined through m ajority voting and 
voters respond to targeting, the political economy models conclude that a universal transfer is the 
optimal solution. W e would therefore expect br oad-based support for universal schem es, even 
more so in countries where pove rty is widespread, targeting pr oves administratively challenging 
and lead to substantial costs.  
 
A lot of research has b een carried out on the eff ectiveness and efficiency of different targetin g 
approaches. The existing evidence furthered our knowledge as to how targ eting mechanisms of 
different complexities perform in different country contexts, what kind of costs they involve and 
which administrative capacity they require  (Coady et al., 2004, Slat er and Farrington, 2009, 
Samson et al., 2006). Surprisingly little empirical research has however been conducted around 
the political economy of targeting in developing  countries, despite the growing awareness that 
politics are not a subordinate bu t integral element of any targ eting decision. There are studies 
which show that universal social transfers, such as social pensions, are generally better protected 
against inflation and political pressu re than targeted transfers. In Sri Lanka social benefit values  
eroded by 40 percent as a result of inflation after the introduction of targeting. In Columbia, food 
subsidies were eventually completely eliminated once universal access was replaced by narrow  
targeting and the prog ramme became politically unpopular (Pritchett,  2005). Su ch indirect 
evidence suggests that the political econom y may i ndeed play a role in the targeting decision. 
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This paper attempts to enlarg e the evidence base by analysing actual ta rgeting preferences of 
citizens in Zambia and revisiting the assumptions underlying the political  economy model in the 
context of a low-income country.   
 
The paper starts by critically discussing the key assumptions behind the political economy 
models (Section 2) and hypothesizi ng on other factors which are cu rrently not incorporated into 
the models but have been identified by the literatu re as important regarding targeting preferences 
(Section 3). Section 4 presents the methodology used to test wh ether the predictions of the 
models hold in the low-incom e country of Z ambia with the m ain empirical findings being 
presented in section 5. We critically discuss in Section 6 to what extent the assumptions behind 
the universal political economy arguments apply in a low-income country like Zambia. Section 7 
concludes and points towards further research needs.  
2 Revisiting the arguments for universal transfers 
Within the political econom y models of targeting the budget for tr ansfers is determined through 
majority voting with voters responding to the degree of targeting. Assuming three distinct income 
groups (low, middle and high), the m odels postulate that the support of at least two income  
groups is necessary. Since the poor are always in favour of higher taxes1, and the rich in favour of 
lower taxes, the vote of the middle income group is decisive in this model. Since the middle class 
has good and bad tim es, their support for redistributive transfers de pends on their probability of 
being in need at som e point in their life. A shif t to a nar rowly targeted programme with little  
leakage to the non-poor can underm ine the politic al support for the programm e if the m iddle-
                                                
1 Low wage workers do not pay taxes in the model of Gelbach and Pritchett (2002), mirroring employment in the 
informal sector. 
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class is sufficiently unlikely to  receive the transfer. As a re sult, the budget fo r transfers is 
adjusted downwards and the poor are worse off from better targeting. For the poor to benefit from 
a transfer p rogramme, a certain degree of leakage is  therefore necessary. In their m odel, de 
Donder and Hindriks (1998) find th at three quarter of the populat ion need to be covered for  
continuous support, which is close to universal.2    
 
As with all theoretical models, the political economy models of targeting attempt to break down a 
rather complex reality into its key  elements and draw conclusions on the basis of a set of 
assumptions. Not all political economy m odels of targeting depart f rom the sam e assumptions 
and scenarios however: the m odel by de D onder and Hindriks (1998)  experiments with 
simultaneous voting on tax rates and the budget share, while Gelbach and Pritchett (2002) let the 
voters decide on the tax rate after they have been  presented with a targeting scenar io. Within the 
models of Gelbach and Pritchett (2002) and Moene and Wallerstein (2001) transfers act as a kind 
of unemployment insurance3 next to being a redistributive instrument. This a spect is no t 
considered in de Donder and Hindrik’s model. Moene and Wallerstein (2001) stress the centrality 
of self-interest of voters for a universal vote and show that al truism would produce different  
outcomes while altruism as a motive next to self-interest still leads to universalism in the models 
by de Donder and Hindriks and Gelbach and Pritchett.  
 
All authors agree that voters decide – even if not entirely – on th e basis of self-interest with the 
expectation to derive d irect financial benefits from the programme in the f uture. In all m odels 
                                                
2 In a slight variation, they let the targeting and tax rate be determined simultaneously. In that case, the poor are the 
decisive group as they can form coalitions with either the middle or high income group in order to raise taxation and 
targeting (De Donder & Hindriks, 1998). The argument rests on the assumption that the poor can act as one group. 
Lower income groups are less inclined to unite and support redistributive policies as a result of last-place aversion 
which prevents political unity among the poor (Kuziemko et al. 2011). 
3 An unemployed middle income worker is automatically eligible for a transfer.  
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either the median voter (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001) or a coalition of the poor and middle class 
(Gelbach and Pritchett, 2002, De Donder and Hindriks, 1998) is decisive for policy m aking and 
realizes its interests through vo ting. Social budget endogeneity, m eaning that the budget is not 
fixed but is responsive to m ajority-votes, is equally a strong a ssumption in all three m odels. If 
budgets are indeed responsive, a shift to narrow targeting would undermine political support for 
social spending in the long run. The poor would be  worse off. Therefore, universal transfers 
provide higher utility for the poor. In the fo llowing, we review the critical assum ptions 
underlying these theoretical models within the context of low-income countries.  
2.1 Self-interested voters 
Moene and Wallerstein (2001) dem onstrate that as soon as some level of altruism is introduced, 
the political equilibrium moves towards targeting. If the m edian voter behaves altruistically and 
derives utility from  a generous transfer to the poor, narrower targeting might not necessaril y 
result in votes for m inimal budgets. True altruism  may actually lead to an outcome where more 
effective targeting leads to better results, a nd where reducing leakage makes the ‘good’ (i.e. 
poverty reduction) cheaper. Hence,  voters want more of this (P ritchett, 2005). The influence of 
altruism on targeting outcom es should not be negl ected as experimental evidence on collective 
action problems has shown that individuals act altruistically and not necessa rily as the homo 
economicus in the standard micro economic models (Bowles, 2008).    
 
But even if we assum e that agents are mainly self-interested, the universal welfare state is n ot 
inevitably the only equilibrium  of the voti ng game (Rothstein, 2002, Tabor, 2002). Whether the 
median voter opts for a universal or selective welfare state depends not  only on m onetary gains 
but also on more subtle benefits. Governm ent support to the poor can have positive externalities. 
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Those among the middle class who presently cater for the poor, those who are m ore risk-averse 
and value a more generous unemployment insurance, who sell goods and services to the poor and 
who appreciate that better support prevents a number of social  problems such as high crime rates 
are all likely to benefit from  support going directly to the poor (Tabor , 2002). By supporting the 
poor, overall social welfare can increase and resu lt in higher utility of  the non-poor (Atkinson, 
1998).  
 
In addition, if targeting leads to greater cost-e ffectiveness or if the non- poor benefit sufficiently 
from spending cuts (i.e. the gain from lower tax ra tes is larger than the gains from leakage), they 
may also favour a reallocation of  spending to the poor (Ravallion, 1999, De Donder and 
Hindriks, 1998, Atkinson, 1998). Movi ng from universal access to ta rgeting is then a Pareto 
improvement (De Donder and Hindriks, 1998).4 This effect would be even greater when the non-
poor can rely on private m arkets rather than the state for unemployment insurance (Gelbach and 
Pritchett, 2002). The question is however whethe r pro-poor spending would then be sufficiently 
protected (Ravallion, 1999). Spending for the poor m ight be better protected in regions with a 
strong tradition of effective redistribution.5 
2.2 A coalition of the poor and middle class is politically decisive 
The political feasibility  of targeting social programm es to a specific group depends on the 
preferences of politically more powerful groups (Sen, 1995). Most theoretical models assume that 
the middle income group or the median voter is decisive in voting as the rich always favour lower 
taxes and the poor favour higher taxes. However, De Donder and Hindriks (1998) show that the 
                                                
4 On the other hand, relaxing targeting from very high levels can also make everybody better-off (De Donder & 
Hindriks, 1998). 
5 This is a rephrasing of the argument made by Graham (2002), where she links the strong faith in individual effort 
over state redistribution in Latin America to their weak tradition of effective redistribution. 
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poor voters actually becom e decisive when the level of taxation and the degree of targeting are 
simultaneously voted on and the poor form strategic, alternating coalitions with the middle clas s 
and the rich.  
 
This assumption of the m edian voter being decisi ve presumes a dem ocratic setting in which th e 
government is accountable to its constituency  and voting actually tr anslates into policy-
decisions.6 It might be questionable to what extent democratic structures of this nature have taken 
root in low-income countries. Citizens have often little means to influence policy-m aking, even 
through the election process. This  proves particularly challengi ng for groups such as the poor 
who are often not sufficiently organized in large numbers to see their interests represented (Myles 
and Quadagno, 2002). Even if elected representati ves were interested in  translating voters’ 
interests into action, they would face difficulties in reg imes where the role of the P arliament is 
curtailed to the benefit of the executive. This means th at in low-income countries with a lower 
degree of democratization, the rich could be strong enough to force a decision in their own right.  
2.3 Budget endogeneity 
The political system  also affects the assum ption of budget endogeneity. In a dictatorial or 
patrimonial political system, the budget m ight be (near) fixed as the pub lic has no influence on 
government decisions. Even if we assum e that budgets are actually voted on, m ost low-income 
countries will face difficulties to sufficiently  increase the budget for a particular transfer 
programme, either thro ugh additional revenue or shifting  government spending from  other 
sectors.  
 
                                                
6 In Gelbach & Pritchett’s model (2002) targeting is the optimal outcome in the special case that political 
considerations do not matter. 
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It is undoubtedly true that there is leeway in most low-income countries to improve tax-regimes 
and increase the governm ent budget; whether feas ible tax reform s however suffice to fund 
programmes in the order of magnitude of 2-4% of GDP 7 remains debatable. Broadening the tax 
base is particularly challenging in countries wh ere the majority of the population works in the 
informal sector which is difficult to tax, the marginal costs of taxation are high and where further 
taxation might also discourage m uch needed private investment. Hence, as long as the tax base 
cannot be expanded and the budget is fixed, na rrow targeting m ay be the politically m ore 
sustainable policy option (Pritchett, 2005, Graham, 2002).8 
 
The political dynamics become even more complex when we consider funding a more broadly 
targeted programme through budget reallocations instead of a tax increase. This would mean that 
voters do not decide on particular  interventions in isolation but decide jointly on  whether they 
would like an increase in unem ployment insurance for a decrease in funding for another 
programme. The middle-class might be less supportive of a universal transfer  if this results in 
budget cuts for other interventions such as fertilizer subsidies from which they largely benefit.  
3 Looking beyond the model assumptions  
The political economy models ignore a number of factors that other au thors have raised in th e 
debate on universal versus targeted transfers or in the literature on redistributive preferences.  
                                                
7 For cost calculations of a categorical child grant, see for example ILO 2008. 
8 This also applies in the case of donor funding. However, the argument is linked to altruistic preferences of donors 
which are in favor of sharp targeting (Pritchett, 2005). 
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3.1 Attitudes towards the poor 
Electoral support for ta rgeted programmes depends on atti tudes and perceptions about the 
targeting criteria (Gelbach a nd Pritchett, 2002, Pritc hett, 2005, Van de Wa lle, 1998). Attitudes 
towards the poor influence the voting behaviour fo r redistributive policies, in particular when 
countries face great fiscal constr aints (Graham, 2002). Poverty seen as a result of bad luck and 
exogenous factors, rather than lack of effort, garners m ore support for social spending and 
redistribution (Fong, 2001, Alesina and La Ferr ara, 2005, Boarini and Le Clainche, 2009). A 
policy which hence favours the poor  is politically m ore sustainable if they are perceived as 
deserving. According to Graham  (2002: 10), “the distincti on between deserving and non-
deserving poor may be a more important determinant of public support for welfare in the United 
States than is tha t between targeted and universal programm es.” There is also ev idence from 
experimental economics supporting the view that merit is a determining factor as to who receives 
support (Hoffman et al., 1994, Cappelen et al., 2011, Cappelen et al., 2007).  
3.2 Norms about social justice 
Ideological orientations or institutional structures can equally have a bearing on the acceptance of 
welfare programmes (Graham, 2002, Mkandawi re, 2005, Korpi and Palm e, 2004, Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). W hile countries where th e state has only played  a residual role in 
welfare support might be m ore reluctant to  accept broader and  more expen sive welfare 
programmes, countries where the state has tr aditionally provided com prehensive welfare 
packages, tend to oppose closely targeted progra mmes. People’s understanding of social justice 
can prove influential in determining whether they are more inclined to targeting or universalism. 
Those societies who accord more importance to a justice of perfor mance rather than needs-based 
justice and who believe in the equality of opport unity rather than in the equality of outcom e 
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might favour a m ore targeted approach. 9 They would be m ore likely to subsc ribe to th e 
subsidiarity principle with the welf are state only coming in when indiv iduals face difficulties 
providing for themselves.  
3.3 The importance of cohesion 
The greater the sim ilarity between the poor and middle class, the m ore likely is the support for  
poverty programmes (Graham, 2002). Stated differently, the higher th e level of inequality in a 
given society, the stronger the argum ents for universal transfers as the distance between the poor 
and non-poor may just be too large. The distance may not only be defined in financial but also in 
geographic terms or with respect to individual characteristics. If the m ajority of the poor for 
instance lives in rem ote areas, i.e. they are not visible, suppor t may dwindle. T he impact of 
proximity to people in need on redistributive preferences is al so confirmed by other authors. 
Luttmer (2001) distinguishes between the negative  exposure effect and the racial group loyalty. 
An increasing share of benefit recipients within the local co mmunity decreases the support for 
welfare. On the other hand, support for welfar e spending is higher if  a larger share of 
beneficiaries belongs to one’s own social group.10 Societies with high demographic heterogeneity 
are less supportive to redistributive policies as the share of benefi ciaries in each group is 
relatively small (Luttmer, 2001). 
3.4 Procedural justice & effectiveness 
Whether targeting can be implemented in a procedurally fair way without too many negative side 
effects and whether it actually prod uces an effective ou tcome are also im portant considerations. 
                                                
9 Here we do not refer to a single programme but to the way the welfare state is structured and whether the focus is in 
general on universal provisions for citizens without a specific poverty-focus or whether interventions are mainly 
tailored to satisfy the needs of the poor.  
10 Pritchett (2005) calls this mechanism ‘framing’. 
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Targeting can lead to substantial costs at d ifferent levels, which th e electorate might not be 
willing to accept such as a high level of stigmatization or fraud and favouritism on behalf of the 
administration or communities in volved in th e process (Rothstein, 2 002, Tabor, 2002). At the 
same time, targeting might also contribute to gr eater fairness if it le ads to actuarial soundness, 
reduces leakages and establishe s a clear link between transfer s and poverty reduction (Tabor, 
2002).  
 
The effectiveness of a programme or at least people’s perception of it can also influence political 
support. Many targeted programmes such as public work programmes, in-kind transfers or CCTs 
are politically popular because th ey are percei ved as effectively redu cing poverty, changing 
recipients’ behaviour and prom oting human development. The objective of a programme m ight 
also determine whether targeted or universal tr ansfers are considered  more effective and enjoy 
greater political popularity: a differe nt target group might be considered relevant for a safety net 
programme with an equ ity perspective when co mpared to a safety ropes programme with an 
insurance perspective (Pritchett, 2005).  
3.5 Path dependency 
We can also expect a certain path dependency of  targeting regimes, meaning that preferences are 
pre-determined by targeting choices made in the past (Mkandawire, 2005) as well as regime types 
and their underlying understanding of social ju stice (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Path 
dependency might be large for universal transfers such as subsidies, where reforms are difficult to 
launch (Grosh et al., 2008). Refor ms are difficult as a move from universalism to targeting is not 
likely to generate any tax reductions for the rich or the middle class, which means that everybody 
loses out unless there is compensation offered.  
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4 Data 
In the rem ainder of this paper, we  empirically test wheth er the pr edictions of the political 
economy model hold in a low income country context, assessing the relevance of the assumptions 
underlying the political economy models as well as  other contributing factors. We chose Zambia 
as a case study for the following  reasons: the country is curr ently debating on whether to 
introduce targeted or universal benefits, m eaning that we are unlikely to observe a strong path 
dependency. Both approaches are being piloted. It  is also a country that shares a num ber of 
characteristics with other low-income countries such as a strong prebandalist approach to policy-
making, a limited resource base as well as a relatively high poverty incidence.    
 
In a f irst step, we elicited ta rgeting preferences through an attitudinal survey11, asking 
respondents which target group they would prioritize as a policy maker given the choice between 
children, the elderly, pe ople with disability, the extrem ely poor or nobody. W hile this question 
only refers to the p referred target group without taking into account the financial implications, it 
allows people to m ake an unrestricted choice based on their preference s. The political econom y 
models also presume that individuals from different strata consider all the possible trade-offs for 
themselves when voting on the budget. Using background information about the respondents, 
information about their percepti ons and attitudes as well as further information about the 
Zambian context, we analyse in  a second step which factors appear to have predom inantly 
influenced their preferences. 
 
                                                
11 The structure of the questionnaire was partly inspired by the world value survey as well as the questions asked by 
Graham (2002). 
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The survey12 was adm inistered among 435 urban respond ents in Lusaka, 396 students of the 
University of Zambia (UNZA) and among 500 rural participants of Monze district in Southern 
province. While the 500 rural partic ipants were random ly selected,13 urban respondents and 
students were purposef ully sampled. Care was ta ken to guarantee sufficient variation am ong 
urban respondents and students by choosing di fferent geographical locations in Lusaka 14 as well 
as different years and faculties at the University15. This approach assured that the sample covered 
respondents of different locations, background a nd educational status, even though it is not 
representative for the entire population of Zambia. 
 
Among the urban respondents to th e attitudinal survey, we find slightly m ore men (55%) than 
women (45%). The group of respondents is 31.5 years on average, mirroring quite closely 
Zambia’s demographics. The respondents to the urban attitudinal survey  have relatively high 
educational levels (close to 40% have a tertiary education level completed). The majority are also 
in stable employm ent (government, self-employment, other wage-em ployment).16 In term s of 
poverty status, m ost of the respondents charac terized themselves as belonging to the m iddle 
stratum (58%), with 26% characterizing themselves as (very) poor and 16% as upper m iddle and 
rich. The composition of the urban sam ple confirms our expectation that  the urban population is 
                                                
12 See Schüring (2012) for the questionnaires. 
13 Participants from rural communities of Monze district were randomly selected for participating in the allocation 
and conditionality experiment that also included an attitudinal survey. They were chosen from a pool of volunteers 
which was clustered into very poor, poor and better-off participants. The sample consisted of 30% percent very poor, 
40% poor and 30% better-off. 
14 Markets, mini-bus and intercity-bus stops and shopping malls were selected as interview sites in order to maximize 
the likelihood of encountering people of different backgrounds. Enumerators were instructed to ensure some 
variation in respondents, approaching people of different gender, age and poverty status. 
15 Selected lecturers were asked by their faculty to administer the questionnaires to students in their respective 
classes. Students came from all across Zambia, with Lusaka, Copperbelt and Southern province being most 
represented. Students were enrolled in different study years and disciplines with predominantly 2nd, 3rd and 4th year 
students from Humanities, Natural Sciences and Agriculture responding to the survey. 
16 As opposed to piecework, unpaid family worker and people who cannot participate in the labor market. 
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likely to be better educated, wealthier and m ore in formal employment than the rural population, 
constituting a higher proportion of taxpayers rather than welfare recipients. 
 
Students are expected to be the best-educated group, belong to  the richer stra tum of Za mbia’s 
society and become the future elite as well as fu ture taxpayers of Za mbia. They would be least 
concerned with acquiring insurance against poverty or any adverse ev ents in life. Similar to the 
urban population, the majority of students charact erized themselves as belonging to the m iddle 
class (57%), with 12% characterizing them selves as (very) poor and one third characterizing 
themselves as upper middle class and rich. Students come from different backgrounds in terms of 
their parents’ occupation even if the occupation does not appear to be correlated with students’ 
perception about their poverty status.  About the sam e percentage of  female and male students 
participated. 
 
The rural population is pre-dom inantly poor but also includes bett er-off individuals. The better-
off would neither be entitled to welfare benefits nor constitute  a large group of taxpayers as 
employment in rural areas is m ostly informal. Among the rural participants, 59 percent of the 
respondents were female. With an average age of 51 years, the rural popul ation is significantly 
older than the urban respondents. Most of the respondents are subsistence farmers who mainly 
live on their own produce. Despite the fact that 10 percent of all respondents are cash transfer 
beneficiaries, only two percent claim government assistance as their main source of income.  
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5 Results 
5.1 Targeting preferences 
When faced with the choice of giving social transfer s either to all children, all elderly, all people 
with disabilities, to those in extreme poverty or nobody, only two percent of all respondents to 
the attitudinal survey opted against any type of  transfer. As m entioned before, both the students 
as well as the urban population have the largest share of people who consider them selves as 
middle class with a certain probab ility from switching between the info rmal and formal sector. 
Following the logic of the political econom y models, we would expect them, in cooperation with 
the poorer group, the rural population, to prioritize more universal models such as the child grant 
or the social pension, where the middle class has a high likelihood of benefitting themselves and 
the poorer class has a higher probability of benefitting more generously. 
 
Figure 1: Priority target group selected by urban, student and rural respondents 
Question: If you were a policymaker in Zambia, would you give social transfers (government assistance) first to all 
children, all elderly, all people with disabilities, all those in extreme poverty 
 
Source: Attitudinal surveys with the urban population, rural population & students 
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The majority of respondents across all groups prioritized, however, the extremely poor (figure 1). 
Among the urban respondents and students, m ore than 56% opted for the extrem ely poor, three 
times more than for any other target group. Even if we add up votes for a child grant and for a 
pension and com pare those to the other target groups, the group of the extrem ely poor is still 
favoured. Although to a lesser extent, the very poor are still the preferred target group of the rural 
population. There m ight be differe nt reasons w hy targeting preferences for the very poor are 
nevertheless lower: e ither previous experience in targe ting SCT in Monze com munities has 
sensitized respondents more on th e difficulties of actua lly targeting the very  poor and/or the 
higher age am ong rural respondents and greater fa mily size pushes households more strongly 
towards universalism.  
 
Previous exposure to targeted SCT with potenti ally negative experien ces does not explain the  
difference in preferences with other respond ents. Comparing targeting preferences across 
communities with and without a targeted SCT sche me17, rural respondents from SCT 
communities have a six percentag e points higher pr eference for the extrem ely poor as a targ et 
group. Even if the difference is not statistically significant, it means that the targeting experience 
in SCT communities must have at least been neutral, in the sense that it did not chan ge people’s 
targeting preferences towards universalism. When it com es to the correlation betw een age and  
targeting preferences, we observe a stronger inclination among those above 65 to vote for a social 
pension than among those below 65. The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
opposite is however true for targ eting preferences for children: respondents without any children 
were more in favour of a child grant than re spondents with children. Ag ain the difference is 
statistically significant. This shows that other forces than self-interest must play a role. 
                                                
17 About 60 percent of rural respondents are from pilot communities that are on the SCT scheme. 
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Even if we disaggregate targeti ng preferences by the self-assessed income of respondents (figure 
2), we cannot find support for the predictions of  the political economy models. All groups, fro m 
very poor to rich prefer the group of the extr emely poor a nd no coalition between any of the 
groups would subsequently change this result. 
 
Figure 2: Priority target group selected by respondents, by self-assessed income 
Question: If you were a policymaker in Zambia, would you give social transfers (government assistance) first to all 
children, all elderly, all people with disabilities, all those in extreme poverty 
 
Source: Attitudinal surveys with the urban population, rural population & students 
5.2 Corroborative evidence 
One reason why we obtain targeting preferences that are n ot in line with the p redictions of the 
political targeting model is that sur veys may not be the most appropriate tool to elicit targeting 
preferences. Köhler et al. (2009) find for instan ce for Nepal that targeting preferences of people 
changed from targeting to universalism  when t hey carried out focus group discussions (FGD) 
instead of a survey. W e would, however, argu e that FGDs introduce their own b ias as peer 
pressure within the g roup might motivate participants to make choices that are in line with th e 
expectations of other group m embers rather than their own preferences. Experim ental data from 
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an allocation and condition ality experiment actually supp orts the a ssumption that decision-
making at the group level tends to equalize outcomes (see Schüring 2012). 
 
We can triangulate our findings with the data from  the rura l allocation experim ent where 
participants had to make decisions on whom to target given real monetary pay-offs (see Schüring 
2012). Strictly speaking, this data  source doesn’t allow us to test  the validity of the political 
economy models as the experim ents operate under a fixed-budget assumption. The triangulation 
is nevertheless useful as it helps us to see whether the outcome of the survey is just incidental or 
in line with preferences expressed through an experimental approach.  
 
The data from  the experim ent corroborates the findings from the survey that targeting the 
extremely poor is a preferred choice. W e first of  all observe a greater preference for targeting 
rather than distributin g universal benefits among the rural population,  in particular in 
communities with prio r targeting experience. Out of different recipient cha racteristics, the 
poverty status of the recipient has the greatest effect and also proves more statistically significant 
than characteristics such as age or the num ber of young children. W e can thus conclude that 
across different methodologies used, targeting preferences seem to be consistent. 
6 Discussion of results 
In section 1.2 and 1.3 we discussed som e of the potential shortcomings of the political economy 
models of targeting. These m ight also explain why the population in Za mbia did not opt for a 
universal scheme. In order to have  a better idea of pot ential factors that m ade people decide in 
favour of the extremely poor, we now revisit the assumptions of the political economy models as 
well as some of the other decisive factors identified in section 1.3.  
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6.1 Revisiting the assumptions of the political economy model 
In some political econom y models of targeti ng, it m atters whether the voter is purely self-
interested or pursues altruistic  motive. The rural allocation experiment in Zambia offered some 
participants the opportunity to allocate money to themselves and allowed us to see to what extent 
selfishness or altru ism prevailed as  an allocati on motive. 43% of  participants were selfish in 
terms of allocating a higher am ount to them selves than they would have been entitled to 
according to their poverty status. Only 3% of participants, however, allocated all of the money to 
themselves. In addition, 89% of participants agreed to the principle of giving without getting 
anything in return and 42% had actually given support during the last year to another person 
without getting anything in return. T his demonstrates that people are not se lfless but at the sam e 
time consider the welfare of others and m ight potentially be m ore altruistic than the m odels 
would suggest.  
 
Moreover, countries like Zam bia where the government is currently not the main actor in social 
protection provision and support is s till predominantly provided by the fam ily and communities 
probably set a different context fo r a potentially selfish voter. Ev en voters from the middle class 
who would not benefit directly fr om the transfer would ga in from a shif t in welf are provision 
from the family to the state level. This would free up their own financial resources and elim inate 
the need for ad-hoc support.  
 
Even if the m edian voter was in favour of a uni versal scheme, it is question able to what extent 
his/her preferences would realistically translate into po licy changes. Po litical representatives in 
Zambia are not neces sarily voted in  and out of power based on past o r expected performance; 
material benefits provided just before the election often have a greater impact than the political 
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platform of the representative and his/her party. 18 Although the Zam bian Parliament has to 
officially approve the budget, it effectively still has limited power to change it according to their 
voters’ preferences (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009, Mudenda et al., 2005). Interest groups that 
might lobby politicians and in th is way influence policy-m aking often neither have the m andate 
of the people themselves nor the power, in particul ar with the NGO bill that the Governm ent of 
Zambia passed to better control NGO activities 19. All of th ese factors might explain why the 
voter turnout has been relatively  low (45% in the la st election) and why voters in Z ambia might 
not act as strategically as portrayed in the political economy models.    
 
It is also debatable whether people in Zam bia assume budget endogeneity when they express 
their targeting preferences. While a recent study on tax reform highlights  avenues for Zambia to 
improve the efficiency of its tax regim e (Mwila et al., 2011), the potential for big leaps still 
appears limited. With tax revenues of around 15% of GDP (IMF, 2010) Zambia has a narrow tax 
base that cannot easily be expanded to financ e a programm e consuming an additional 2% of  
GDP.  Two percent of GDP or roughly an additional 18% income tax on formal salaries would be 
required to fund a rather m odest monthly transfer of 15 US$ per m onth to every household in 
Zambia.20 Additional tax revenues a re not easy to identi fy: the taxation of the informal sector is 
still in its infancy and the governm ent’s concern about further investments in the m ining sector 
made the windfall tax disappear soon after its introduction in 2008.    
                                                
18 The comment by Former Minister of Finance, Mr. Magande, on the 2011 election is telling in this regard: “Most of 
the voters changed their minds one week before the elections, in the last five, six days, and what made them change 
it's just the money they were given, the chitenge they were given, the sugar, the cooking oil, that went round” 
(http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=23319).    
19 http://www.ms.dk/sw139035.asp 
20 Based on the following assumptions: Total population of 13,046,508 (CSO, Population Projections Report 2011), 
Average household size of 5.3 (LCMS 2008), a monthly transfer of 15 US$ including admin costs of 15%, 511,338  
formal workers (CSO, Labour Force Survey 2008), average annual salary of 4908 US$ (CSO, Labour Force Survey 
2008).  
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6.2 Revisiting other decisive factors 
Figure 3: Opinion of respondents on whether the poor take responsible decisions or whether they are 
irresponsible and should be told what to do21 
 
Source: Attitudinal survey for the urban and student sample 
 
People’s attitudes towards the poo r may have an im pact on targeting preferences. R espondents’ 
attitudes towards the poor in Zambia are quite sympathetic. The lack of initiative and the mindset 
of the poor do not feature as prom inently as other causes of poverty such as the lack of  
opportunities and wrong governm ent policies (S chüring, 2012). The m ajority of urban 
respondents think that the poor take responsi ble decisions, while the students are rather 
indifferent to the question. Only a m inority thinks that the poor are irres ponsible (figure 3). This 
indicates that the poor are not regarded as und eserving; the better-off understand that the poor 
have to deal with a number of adversities that they cannot influence and are in general considered 
trustworthy. These are all favourable pre-conditions for a social assistance programme targeted to 
the poor. 
 
                                                
21 This question was not asked to the rural population for practical reasons. As the rural population participated in an 
allocation experiment and responded to several surveys, the attitude questionnaire had to be shortened and reduced in 
complexity. 
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Figure 4: Preferences for income (in)-equality and perception on the merits of working hard 
Source: Attitudinal survey for the urban and student sample 
 
When it co mes to ideology or in stitutional structures, the results of the attitud inal survey 
furthermore testify that most re spondents believe in encouraging individual effort. When asked 
about preferences for incom e-equality, the m ajority of respondents favoured larger incom e 
differences as incentives for individual effort (Fi gure 4). T here is also  a belief in work effort 
paying off and not resulting in arbitrary outcom es. These beliefs might explain why there is less 
support for universal transfers: the individual is seen in charge of making provisions, in particular 
for phases that might be easier to an ticipate such as old age and children, and is also expected to 
have a realistic chance of doing so. In line with this argum ent, those who opted for a universal 
transfer were less prepared to accept income inequalities than those who voted for a disability or 
poverty grant. The difference is statistically significant. 
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Figure 5: Respondents' opinions on whether the government or individual should take more responsibility 
 
Source: Attitudinal survey for the urban and student sample 
 
Encouraging individual effo rt does however no t rule out a role for the state, even if this ro le 
might be more residual than encompassing. W ith the bu rden of social protection lying on the 
individual rather than the state in the Zam bian society, the majority of the respondents expect 
government to increase its efforts (figure 5).  Interestingly, the government is seen by far to have 
the largest responsibility to cater for the poor, even stronger than the fam ily and the community  
(table 1). The com bination of want ing to enco urage individual effort while accep ting that the 
state has a role to play in supporting the individual in adverse situations in life might explain why 
there is such great acceptance for a poverty grant.  
 
Table 1: Respondents‘ opinion on whether the following stakeholders have some form of responsibility to take 
care of the poor 
  Urban Students Rural 
  Agree Rank 
No of 
obs. Agree Rank 
No of 
obs. Agree Rank 
No of 
obs. 
Family 69% 4 432 69% 2 373 71% 6 498 
Community 61% 5 429 56% 5 366 73% 5 497 
Entire society 55% 6 428 63% 4 365 67% 7 497 
Government 93% 1 428 83% 1 376 90% 1 499 
Church 70% 3 427 64% 3 365 90% 2 498 
NGOs 73% 2 424 55% 6 363 88% 3 496 
International CPs 47% 7 427 32% 7 363 75% 4 481 
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Source: Attitudinal survey for the urban, student and rural sample 
 
Most of the respondents had no prior exposure to universal or targeted transfer. Their answers 
were not influenced by any positive or negative experiences with the targeting process. Only part 
of the rural population had prior exposure to targ eted transfers which did not negatively im pact 
people’s preference for targeting as shown above. It would certain ly be interesting to see how  
preferences differ am ong the dis tricts in Zam bia that are currently piloting different targeting 
approaches. 
7 Conclusion 
This study has shown that it m ight not necessarily be such an  obvious choice for low-incom e 
countries whom to target. Even though the politic al economy models of targeting are right to 
suggest that political considera tions are central and not subordi nate to technical concerns, it 
might not be such a straightforward relationship between political considerations and targeting as 
suggested. Drawing on attitudinal survey data from Zambia, we have highlighted that some of the 
central assumptions of the politi cal economy models might not necessarily hold in the context of 
a low-income country and that other factors c ould equally have a bear ing on voters’ attitudes  
towards targeting such as attitudes towards the poor, their understanding of social justice, 
cohesion, experienced procedural justice and effectiveness as well as the fact whether a 
programme is designed from scratch or has already been in existence.  
 
The extent to which these different factors m atter in different country contexts and whether we 
can establish any trends would be subject to further researc h. On the basis of the existing 
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literature and the case study of Za mbia, we hypothesize that countries with a stronger preference 
for targeting would be countries with a rather homogeneous society with relatively low economic 
inequality. Voters in these coun tries would believe in the collec tive responsibility of protecting 
the poor and they exhibit a certain  level of altruism , while still believing in the principles of 
subsidiarity. These countries m ight be characterized by limited democratic accountability and a 
nearly fixed budget, potentially supported by donor financing. Universal preferences m ight 
resonate more with countries with high leve ls of economic inequality, a heterogeneous societ y 
with a strong belief in com prehensive state provision, populated by self-interested voters and a 
democratic government accountable to its constituency.  
 
In order to get a better understanding of these political determinants and their relative importance, 
it would be recommendable to carry out a cross-national study. This would help to strengthen the 
political economy models of targeting and ensure that policie s around targeting are based on the 
right set of assumptions and factors. 
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